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Abstract  
 
Based on the 8320 observations in 40 quarters of 16 listed banks, this 
paper empirically analyses the macro-prudential supervision's impact 
on commercial bank's capital operation through the dynamic 
unbalanced panel system GMM model. The results show that 
macro-prudential supervision has exerted active supervision on 
China's commercial banks, guiding China's commercial banks to 
establish a capital restraint mechanism and improving the bank's 
internal capital supplement mechanism. The response of commercial 
banks to capital supervision is positive. The regulatory rating results 
influence the active adjustment of the bank's follow-on capital ratio. 
Commercial banks basically meet the requirements for prudent 
management of countercyclical capital. Based on the analysis of the 
data in the article, this paper suggests that the regulatory authorities 
further strengthen the bank's capital supervision and make the bank's 
macro-prudential supervision appear more counter-cyclical. At the 
same time, we must appropriately improve the banking ownership 
structure, increase the sources of external funds for commercial 
banks, and enhance the transparency of the financial system so that 
uninsured loan holders can play a significant role in binding banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks play a key role in allocating effective economic resources. However, banks themselves are 
vulnerable and opaque. If supervision is not in place, it may bring instability to the entire financial system and 
bring high costs to the society. Originating in 2008, the U.S. global financial crisis has exposed the lack of 
financial supervision. For this reason, international organizations such as the Financial Stability Board, the 
Basel Committee, and the International Monetary Fund have actively pursued a macro-prudential model in an 
attempt to curb the pro-cyclical behaviour of various financial institutions. In accordance with the 
requirements of Basel III, banks must possess net-value collateral assets that are proportionate to risky assets, 
minimize bank speculation, and protect banks from financial shocks. With the implementation of Basel III, the 
People's Bank of China began implementing the “Administrative Measures for the Capital Management of 
Commercial Banks (Trial)” in 2013, which puts forward requirements for the capital adequacy of systemically 
important banks and non-systemically important banks. The China Banking Regulatory Commission jointly 
promotes the new capital agreement. 
With the advancement of macroprudential policies, more and more researchers have begun to pay 
attention to the capital operations of financial institutions, especially capital buffers. Judging from the existing 
research content, the study covers many aspects of capital operations. For example, existing evidence shows 
that the capital adequacy ratio of banks is far higher than the required requirements. Therefore, many 
researchers are exploring the banks' main motivation to hold capital buffers. Milne and Whalley (2001) and 
Milnes (2004) established a dynamic model of bank capital decisions. They found that when accepting capital 
controls, bankers will balance costs and profits from various aspects. For example, when they violate the 
minimum regulatory requirements, they will suffer from punishment, the cost of holding surplus capital, and 
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the cost and time limit of adjusting capital level, etc. These models have important implications for the study 
of capital control. 
Another series of research on capital operations is related to the cyclical nature of the economy. Ayuso, 
Pérez, and Saurina (2004) studied the impact of the business cycle on bank behaviour and provided evidence 
that capital operations may be pro-cyclical. That is, banks tightened their balance sheets during economic 
recession and banks expanded balance sheets during economic growth. However, some researchers have come 
to the opposite conclusion. Jokipii and Milne (2008) found that the banks of countries that have just joined the 
European Union showed counter-cyclical behaviour. Francis and Osborne (2009) reached a similar conclusion 
when they studied the capital behaviour of British banks. Estrella (2004) summarized periodic oscillations in a 
dynamic model. The results of this study indicate that the most appropriate capital level is negatively related 
to the value-in-risk capital limit throughout the entire cycle. The model also gives useful insights on financial 
stability. 
There are also researchers who are exploring external factors that affect the level of capital. Blum (2002), 
Francis and Osborne (2009) find that wholesale funding markets and subprime mortgage debt may lead banks 
to take greater risks. Therefore, they propose to limit subprime mortgage debt. Nier and Baumann (2006) 
found that the market played a constraint role. In addition, Fonseca and González (2010) found that 
differences in country-to-country regulatory systems, accounting disclosure systems, and deposit insurance 
systems all affect bank capital retention. 
Domestic researchers also conducted a lot of research, mainly focusing on the cyclical characteristics of 
capital operations, factors that affect capital retention, and capital operating mechanisms.  
Overall, existing research covers the essential attributes of capital operations, the relationship between 
capital operations and economic cycles, and the factors that affect the financial institutions' holding of net 
capital. However, there is not much research on the impact of macro-prudential supervision on the capital 
operation of commercial banks. In view of this, this paper will use the dynamic unbalanced panel system GMM 
model and the data of state-owned large-scale banks, joint-stock listed banks, and some city commercial banks 
from 2006 to 2016 to analyse the impact of macro-prudential supervision on the capital operation of 
commercial banks. 
The rest of the paper consists of research design, data processing, results analysis, and the conclusion and 
recommendations. 
 
2. Research Design 
2.1. Establishing a Dynamic Model of Capital Buffering 
Based on the capital buffer adjustment model constructed by Francis and Osborne (2009) and by 
controlling the bank’s output capacity, market evaluation, account items, and structural characteristics, such as 
scale, business management, market constraints, regulatory oversight, economic environment, etc., this study 
explores the relationship between risk and target capital ratio. By using the difference between the bank's 
capital ratio and the above variables, we explain the various banks' capital operations. 
Specifically, based on a dynamic empirical model, we measure the relationship between bank's net capital 
retention and banking business elements by calculating the costs of capital regulation and capital control. In 
the following equations, the capital adjustment is dynamically changing. Bank i only partially reaches 
the optimal buffer between t-1 and t, . As the adjustment cost decreases, the proportion and speed θ of 
the cost adjustment will increase. When the adjustment cost is 0, the capital is fully adjusted (θ=1), and the 
observed buffer  is just equal to the most appropriate plus an exogenous error factor, . 
 或  
     （1） 
Of course, the capital optimization buffer also includes other factors. In light of previous research, this 
study believes that capital optimization buffering can be seen as a function of four fundamental factors that 
influence bank decisions, see Equation 2. First, the impact of the banking business model (MNG); second, the 
regulatory pressure (SUP); third, the market pressure (MKT); and finally, the economic environment 
(CYCLE). 
     （2） 
The first three influencing factors correspond to the three regulations in Basel II. The fourth factor is the 
basis for the macro-prudential management requirements in the New Basel Agreement. Each influencing 
factor has specific indicators. See the following equation: 
（3） 
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2.2. Explanation of Explanatory Variables 
Table 1 lists the main explanatory variables and their expected values involved in this study. 
 
Table-1. Explain variables and expectations. 
Influencing 
factors 
Variables Definition Rationale  
Expected 
value 
Capital 
management 
BUFt-1 
Lagging capital buffer 
 
Adjusting costs 
 
+ 
ROE 
Roe 
 
Higher cost of capital 
 
- 
VOL 
Volatility of net assets income 
 
Bank risk status 
 
+ 
NPL 
Non-performing loan rate 
 
Bank exposure 
 
- 
SIZE 
Total assets 
 
Easy access to the capital 
market 
 
- 
LIQUID 
Liquidity ratio 
 
Lower liquidation costs 
 
+ 
Regulatory 
pressure 
SUPERVt-１ 
Camel rating system 
 
Regulatory effect 
 
+ 
Market 
pressure  
PEER 
Similar bank capital buffer 
average 
 
Market Constraint Effect 
and Peer Pressure 
 
+ 
BANKDEP Riskless bank deposits 
 
Market constraint effect 
 
+ 
SUBORD 
Subordinated debt 
 
Market constraint effect 
 
+ 
Economic 
environment 
GDPG 
GNP year-on-year ratio 
 
Capital buffer 
 
+ 
LOANG Total loan growth rate Credit demand control - 
     BUFt-1 is a lagged capital buffer, reflecting adjustment costs. Higher capital costs are associated with lower regulation speeds. 
 
2.3. Capital Management Includes the Following Indicators 
ROE (return on equity). From the perspective of trade-off theory, the cost of capital is high, and it is 
expected that the value is negative. However, from the perspective of preferential order financing theory, as an 
important source of capitalization, it is expected that the value is positive. 
NPL is a non-performing loans and represents the exposure of the company. It is expected that the value 
will be negative. 
SIZE means total assets. The wider the route of access to the capital market, the more diversified, the 
better the investment opportunity, and the less likely it is to have a capital buffer. It is expected that the value 
will be negative. 
LIQUID is a liquid asset. The greater the liquidity, the lower the liquidation cost. 
 
2.4. Regulatory Pressure 
Supervision is mainly reflected in SUPERVt-１, the supervisory CAMEL ratings system, and the expected 
regulatory effect is positive. 
 
2.5. Market Pressure  
SUBORD is a subordinated debt, which reflects market constraints and has a positive expected effect. 
BANKDEP is a risk-free bank deposit that reflects market constraints and expects positive results. 
PEER is peer pressure and is represented by the average of capital buffers in peer groups, reflecting 
another variable in market constraints with positive expectations. 
 
2.6. Economic Environment 
GDPG is the GDP growth. If it is wise capital management, it is expected that the value is positive; if it is 
short-sighted capital management, it is expected that the value is negative. 
LOANG is a loan growth that reflects the change in credit demand of a single bank and expects the value 
to be positive. 
The expected values of the relevant variables are given based on the results of previous studies. For 
example, existing studies show that the three main factors affecting the capital buffer are adjustment costs, 
capital profitability, and bank's risk appetite. Like other companies, a bank with maximized profits may balance 
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the cost of holding the remaining capital and the cost incurred when the operation fails. When the opportunity 
cost of capital is high, bankers may hold a lower capital ratio. Conversely, if bankruptcy is violated by 
regulatory requirements, the banker may choose a higher capital standard. In this way, as the regulatory 
authorities expect, banks with greater risks will have greater capital buffers. Therefore, from the trade-off 
point of view, the net value of mortgage assets (ROE) can be used to represent the cost of the net assets to pay 
the net worth, the expected value is negative. 
Although from the trade-off point of view, the expected value of ROE is negative, however, when the 
profit becomes the main source of recapitalization, the expected value should be positive, which is consistent 
with the PSE theory. In fact, researchers have distinguished the reasons for the positive correlation between 
bank profits and capital ratios long before. Under a diversified framework, as long as marginal profits are not 
distributed as dividends, higher profits will lead to an increase in capital. If investors are unwilling to take 
risks and the market is not perfect, then the increase in capital will reduce the cost of bankruptcy and the 
expected rate of return of the market, which will increase the expected profit. 
 
3. Data Processing 
The data includes quarterly information on major state-owned banks, joint-stock listed banks and some 
city commercial banks from the fourth quarter of 2006 to the third quarter of 2016. There are a total of 22 
listed banks in China, excluding Jiangyin Bank, Wuxi Bank, Jiangsu Bank, Hangzhou Bank, Changshu Bank, 
and Guiyang Bank, which were only recently listed. The final data consists of three types, 16 listed banks, 40 
quarters, and 8320 observations or calculated value composition. The specific data includes description 
information of each bank, balance sheet, account information, and operating parameters that are regularly sent 
to the central bank. 
The bank's capital buffer BUF is calculated as a percentage of the excess regulatory capital and risk 
weight assets, and its value can also be calculated by subtracting the specified minimum capital adequacy ratio 
from the actual capital adequacy ratio. The capital adequacy ratio of the Bank of China is far higher than the 
8% required by the regulation, and the average value in the sample has reached nearly 11.95%. 
ROE is the percentage of the company's after-tax profit divided by net assets. The volatility of the ROE 
for the last four quarters based on the standard deviation measure defines the volatility VOL of net assets. The 
average quarterly return on net assets was 13.02%, and the average return on net assets was 2.56%. As a 
complement to the bank's risk profile, the NPL ratio is defined as the ratio of non-performing loans of financial 
institutions to the total loan balance. When the loan and the interest are overdue for more than 90 days, the 
loan is regarded as a non-performing loan. 
The size of the bank SIZE is defined by the total bank assets. In the sample, 16 listed banks accounted for 
70% of the total assets of the banking industry in the third quarter of 2016, and ICBC alone accounted for 
53%. Liquidity ratio LIQUID is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Most of the current assets are 
cash and government bonds held in combination. 
The risk-free bank deposit BANKDEP is measured by the bank’s cash and deposits with the central bank, 
plus the interbank deposits divided by the total bank deposits. Peer-to-peer capital buffer PEER is calculated 
based on the bank capital buffer average with similar business strategy and scale. According to the 
classification method adopted by the People's Bank of China, listed banks can be divided into three categories: 
1) large state-owned banks; 2) joint-stock listed banks; and 3) city commercial banks. In the sample, about 31% 
of banks are state-owned banks, 50% are joint-stock listed banks, and 19% are city commercial banks. 
In terms of economic environment, we have increased the GDP growth ratio of GDP in the current 
quarter, which can represent the domestic economic cycle. The GDPG is calculated from the ratio of the real 
growth rate of one quarter of GDP to the GDP of the same quarter of the previous year.  
 
Table-2. Statistical description. 
Variable Name  Number of Samples  Mean  Standard Deviation  Min Max 
BUF 640 3.95 2.57 -8.39 22.67 
ROE 640 13.02 7.60 2.51 128.55 
VOL 640 2.56 38.63 -87.07 515.51 
NPL 640 1.56 2.33 0.33 23.5 
SIZE 640 0.47 0.54 0.0056 2.36 
LIQUID 639 43.63 9.29 25.49 79.76 
SUBORD 640 0.73 1.59 0.20 19.69 
BANKDEP 640 23.14 5.62 2.26 45.56 
PEER 640 3.95 2.05 0.21 15.93 
SUPERV 640 694.72 896.68 3.93 3615.26 
LOANG 640 4.62 4.05 -11.61 35.02 
GDPG 640 9.16 2.39 6.4 15 
      Source: the data is taken from WIN.D. 
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A negative value indicates that the bank's business model is short-sighted, because in several banking 
systems, the reverse interaction between the bank's capital buffer and the economic growth variables indicates 
that the economic cycle may greatly affect the bank's behaviour. The growth rate of the total loan amount of a 
single bank is also taken into account. The growth of the individual credit portfolio in the sample is significant, 
with an average increase of 4.62% in each quarter. 
Finally, we included a dummy variable, DModel, in the capital requirements management model to 
control the medium-term changes. We also included quarterly and annual dummy variables Time Dummies to 
obtain quarterly characteristics and annual characteristics of the sample. 
Table 2 presents the basic data of the described variables. Table 3 describes the relationship between these 
variables. 
The data for each variable in Table 2 generally describes the characteristics of the sample bank, while 
Table 3 presents the relationship between variables. 
 
Table-3. Covariance matrix. 
 BUF ROE VOL NPL SIZE LIQUID SUBORD PEER LOANG GDPG SUPERV 
BUF 1.00            
ROE -0.14* 1.00           
VOL -0.16* 0.46* 1.00          
NPL -0.28* 0.06 0.03 1.00         
SIZE 0.20* -0.02 -0.11* 0.04 1.00        
LIQUID 0.16* -0.06 -0.04 -0.13* -0.09* 1.00       
SUBORD -0.18* 0.02 0.01 0.86* -0.01 -0.14* 1.00     
PEER 0.80* -0.09* -0.14* -0.06 0.23* 0.18* -0.06  1.00    
LOANG 0.05 -0.20* -0.06 -0.14* -0.23* 0.08* -0.10* -0.02 1.00   
GDPG -0.15* 0.12* 0.23* 0.31* -0.27* -0.16* 0.30* -0.19* 0.00 1.00   
SUPERV 0.18* 0.00 -0.09* 0.03 0.97* -0.09* -0.02 0.23* -0.22* -0.25* 1.00 
Note: * represents statistically significant at least at the 10% level. 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, in addition to the increase in bank loans, other indicators of bank operations 
have a significant correlation with the capital buffer, in which the correlation coefficient of peer pressure is as 
high as 0.80. 
The panel data used in this study is between the typical macroscopic panel data and microscopic data. It is 
dynamically unbalanced and contains a large amount of temporary information. In the study, the Fisher-type 
statistical method was first used to test the unit of non-stationary data. Root solves the asymptotic nature of 
the data and avoids surface regression in non-integrated non-stationary variables. 
We calculate the regression by the moment estimation (GMM) method. The robustness is verified by a 
two-step delimitation procedure, which compares the estimated results of the system GMM with the known 
characteristic estimates. 
The first delimitation procedure estimate (module I in Table 4) was conducted by POLS (pooled ordinary 
least squares), where the dependent variable and the explanatory variable are defined hierarchically. Since the 
pre-determined variable (the lagging dependent variable) is endogenous to the omitted fixed influence value, 
and violates the necessary condition of OLS consistency, the estimated value is a positive bias, and this value 
determines the high limit of the correlation coefficient. 
The second defined procedure estimate (Module II in Table 4) resolves endogenous issues by removing 
fixed effects through LSDV. Since the relationship between the lag variable and the erroneous term is ignored, 
the variation within the group is biased, and the estimated coefficient of the predetermined variable becomes 
tilted downwards, thus defining a low limit. Although the sample of time units in the study is already greater 
than 30, as the time dimension of the panel increases, the estimated bias is still declining. In the study, 
instrumental variables (IVs) were used to solve this problem. There are many effective tools in the existing 
literature. The systematic GMM is used in this research. The regression system of difference and the 
regression of the levels combine to greatly enhance the statistical efficiency of the estimate. Modules III and 
IV in Table 4 were completed by the system GMM. 
In order to remove the unique effects that are not observed, we use orthogonal deviations rather than 
first-order differences because the conversion of the first-order differences may increase the gap of the unstable 
panel data. We also use a two-step process that is more effective than one-step estimates. We may use two 
corrective measures because of possible minor standard errors that are inconsistent. First, we modified the 
variability and covariance matrix for finite samples. Second, we use the dynamic panel data down test program 
to determine the optimal number of tools. 
Since the number of time items of data is more than the number of individuals in the panel, ie, n<T, the 
generalized moment estimator (GMM) is not applicable (the estimation method of GMM is a consistent 
estimator, ie there is no bias in the estimation when n→∞, but bias in Large deviations in the long panel). This 
study included bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC). The estimated results are shown in 
Table 4. 
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Table-4. Panel tool variable valuation results. 
 I II III IV V 
 
0.655*** 0.586*** 0.526*** 0.641*** 0.607*** 
 (13.42) (5.64) (14.98) (27.92) (23.90) 
 
0.016*** 0.013** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 
 (3.89) (2.64) (2.92) (2.82) (2.92) 
 
-0.003*** -0.002** -0.002* -0.001 -0.002*** 
 (-2.70) (-2.21) (-1.91) (-1.55) (-3.06) 
 
-0.120*** -0.109* -0.154*** -0.112*** -0.101*** 
 (-2.93) (-1.96) (-4.61) (-4.29) (-2.76) 
 
0.505*** 0.159 0.634*** 0.389** -0.054 
 (3.11) (0.66) (3.31) (2.07) (-0.14) 
 
0.008** 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (2.37) (0.64) (0.96) (1.61) (0.73) 
 
-0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (-3.09) (-0.94) (-4.03) (-1.52) (-0.39) 
 
0.033 0.023 0.033 0.033 0.017 
 (0.69) (0.40) (0.74) (0.92) (0.36) 
 
0.392*** 0.487** 0.591*** 0.366*** 0.476*** 
 (4.20) (2.39) (11.88) (11.90) (16.22) 
 
-0.044*** -0.039** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.036*** 
 (-4.07) (-2.61) (-3.66) (-3.36) (-4.16) 
 
0.093*** 0.084** 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.103*** 
 (3.36) (2.69) (5.10) (5.19) (3.89) 
 
   0.005  
    (0.11)  
TIME     0.007 
     (0.87) 
Constant -1.195*** -1.004** 0.000 0.317  
 (-3.22) (-2.27) (.) (0.14)  
 
0.893 0.845    
 
  0.533 0.980  
 
  0.807 0.292  
 
  1.000 1.000  
Note: The dependent variable is the bank's capital buffer and is calculated on the basis that the natural number of capital 
exceeds the prescribed minimum value. In addition to lagged dependent variables, explanatory variables include company-
specific and macroeconomic factors. The first column of data is estimated by mixing the OLS, and the second column is the 
fixed effect of the panel model estimated by the bias correction estimate (LSDV). The third and fourth columns are estimated by 
the system GMM (Sys.GMM). Endogenous variables are set to lag one to five. In all models (I to V), the quarterly and annual 
variables are included, but their correlation coefficients are omitted. *, **, and *** indicate significant levels at the levels of 0.1, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. The Z value (first column) and the t value (second to fifth column) are indicated in parentheses. The 
Hansen test refers to tests that over-recognize restrictions, and tests AR(1) and AR(2) refer to first-order and second-order 
autocorrelations. The p-values are reported for these tests. 
 
4. Analysis of Results 
The GMM estimation results reflected in Table 4 are robust to the demarcation process. As expected, 
module I, estimated by POLS, reflects the highest correlation coefficient estimate (positive bias) on the lagged 
dependent variable; fixed effect module, module II, has the lowest estimate (negative bias); module III And IV, 
based on GMM tools, intermediate values. The correlation coefficient estimates and significance levels of the 
remaining explanatory variables remained largely similar. In addition, the automatic correlation test of the 
tool module shows that the second-order series of relevant default conditions are met, and the Hansen test 
does not reflect the over-determined limitations on the estimation equation. The consistency of the two tests 
can be seen in module V of Table 4. 
 
4.1. The Effect of Capital Supervision on the Operation of Commercial Banks 
The correlation coefficient estimated by the lagged dependent variable BUFt-1 is significant at the 0.01 
level in all models and is positive, with a maximum of 0.655, indicating that the variable is continuous, and the 
adjustment rate of the capital buffer is slow, within the range of values (0<θ<1). The rate of adjustment of the 
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capital buffer is close to that of the capital buffers in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong (see Francis and 
Osborne (2009)). The results of the study support the existing theory of capital buffering, ie, capital 
adjustment costs affect bank decisions. 
The correlation coefficient of the ROE variable is positive in all modules and is significant, indicating that 
some of the bank's earnings have been converted into capital, proving that PSC financing theory. At the same 
time, this also reflects the highly centralized ownership of the banking industry and the limited external 
funding sources of commercial banks. 
In all models, the correlation coefficient of the variable VOL is negative. Except for no significant 
significance in Model IV, it has significant significance in other models, and it has significant significance in 
Model III at the level of 0.1, which indicates that Bank of China is profitable. Stable and high level of capital 
ratios. Similarly, non-performing loans, NPL, are part of the bank's risk portfolio and are negatively correlated 
with the capital buffer. They are significant at the level of 0.1 in Module II. This indicates that banks with 
lower capital buffers have higher non-performing loan ratios and capital. The non-performing loans of banks 
with higher buffering ratios are low, which fully shows that capital supervision has a great influence on 
commercial banks. 
Bank size, SIZE, is significant in Models I, III, and IV, positively correlated and highly correlated, but not 
significant in Models II and V, and the correlation coefficient is negative in Model V, indicating that The 
impact of capital regulation on the size of banks is diverse. Some banks are large in scale but their capital 
buffers are not high. Sometimes, the scale of a bank is not directly related to capital regulation, but it is 
directly related to the institutional nature of the bank. In general, the amount of capital retained by state-
owned listed banks will be lower, while the amount of capital retained by joint-stock listed banks will be 
higher. Similarly, the variable LIQUID is significant only at the 0.01 level in Model I, indicating that banks 
with larger liquid assets do not necessarily have large capital buffers, and capital regulation has different 
effects on commercial banks of different natures. 
 
4.2. Impact of Regulatory Pressure and Market Pressure on Capital Operation of Commercial Banks 
The variable supervisory pressure SUPERVt-1 is endogenous, both 0.000 and negative. It has significant 
significance in tool models I and III, indicating that the rating result will often affect the positive adjustment 
of the bank's follow-on capital ratio, and the bank will increase the capital ratio. Or reduce risk exposure to 
respond to avoid increased monitoring. 
The correlation coefficient for variable subprime debt SUBORD is positive but not significant, indicating 
that the interbank market does not appear to be binding on the bank’s capital ratio, and uninsured loan holders 
may not play a significant role in restricting banks. This is consistent with the recent findings of Mendonc and 
Loures (2009) who did not find empirical evidence of market constraints. One of the reasons may be the 
underdeveloped financial system. 
On the contrary, the impact of inter-bank competition on commercial bank net capital retention is 
obvious. As expected, the variable PEER is positive and significant. Overall, market constraints arise from 
competitors rather than debt holders, and Alfon, Argimon, and Bascu˜nana-ambrós (2004) also obtained the 
same results. However, pressure from peers on financial stability may also have a negative impact, leading 
banks to lower their capital ratios. 
 
4.3. Impact of Economic Environment on Commercial Banks' Net Capital Retention 
Both the capital buffer and the loan growth and the economic growth have a reaction. In all models, the 
loan growth coefficient is negative and significant. The economic growth coefficient is positive and significant. 
The loan increases the net capital and the economic growth net capital also increases. The increase indicates 
that there is a counter-cyclical relationship between the capital buffer and the economic cycle. That is to say, if 
the economy is in an upward trend, banks will increase the capital buffer. This result is inconsistent with the 
previous research results (Alfon et al., 2004). This shows that China's macroprudential regulation has already 
played a role. After experiencing losses, the real economy has declined, but the banking system will remain 
relatively stable. 
 
5. Conclusion and Suggestion 
This paper empirically analyses the impact of macroprudential supervision on capital operation of 
commercial banks using the dynamic unbalanced panel system GMM model, and finds that the capital buffer 
plays an active role in supervising the commercial banks in China. 1) With the strengthening of macro-
prudential supervision, the bank's non-performing loan ratio is declining, the bank's profits are gradually 
increasing, and profits are transformed into the source of capital, forming a virtuous circle. However, there is 
no direct link between the size of the bank and capital regulation. 2) The bank rating results will affect the 
active adjustment of the bank's follow-on capital ratio, and banks will avoid increasing the monitoring by 
increasing the capital ratio. Similarly, peer competition has a significant impact on commercial bank capital 
operations, but subprime mortgage debt does not. As the financial system is underdeveloped, market 
constraints have not played their due role. 3) The banking system is sound. When the economy goes up, banks 
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will increase their net capital and increase their capital buffers, forming a counter-cyclical relationship with the 
economic cycle, and they will play a role of macro-prudential supervision. 
Based on the above findings, we have come to the following policy recommendations: 1) Capital 
supervision plays a very good role in supervising China's commercial banks, guiding China's commercial banks 
to establish a capital constraint mechanism, and improving the bank's internal capital supplement mechanism. 
At the same time, we must appropriately improve the banking ownership structure and increase the sources of 
external funds for commercial banks. 2) Bank rating results and peer competition have a great influence on the 
capital operation of commercial banks in China. However, due to the lack of transparency in the financial 
system, the inter-bank market cannot constrain the capital ratio of banks. To this end, we must increase the 
transparency of the financial system so that uninsured loan holders can play a significant role in binding 
banks. 3) Commercial banks basically meet the requirements for prudent management of counter-cyclical 
capital. On this basis, banking supervision departments must strengthen supervision and make bank capital 
buffers appear more counter-cyclical. 
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